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ABSTRACT 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is widely used to model interaction between unrelated 
individuals in the study of the evolution of cooperativeness. Many mechanisms have 
been studied which allow for small founding groups of cooperative individuals to 
prevail even when all social interaction is characterised as a PD. Here, a brief critical 
discussion of the role of the PD as the most prominent tool in cooperation research is 
presented, followed by two new objections to such an exclusive focus on PD-based 
models. It is highlighted that only 2 of the 726 combinatorially possible strategically 
unique ordinal 2x2 games have the detrimental characteristics of a PD and that the 
frequency of PD-type games in a space of games with random payoffs does not exceed 
about 3.5%. Although this does not compellingly imply that the relevance of PDs is 
overestimated, in the absence of convergent empirical information about the ancestral 
human social niche, this finding can be interpreted in favour of a rather neglected 
answer to the question of how the founding groups of human cooperation themselves 
came to cooperate: Behavioural and/or psychological mechanisms which evolved for 
other, possibly more frequent, social interaction situations might have been applied to 
PD-type dilemmas only later.  
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1. Why reconsider the structure of the human social niche? 
 
Humans have been found to possess strikingly high levels of 
cooperativeness (Clutton-Brock 2009; Jaeggi et al. 2010; Jensen et al. 
2007), raising challenging research questions for many disciplines, 
especially biology and economics (Hammerstein and Hagen 2005; Rankin 
2011). However, the problem if and how cooperativeness can evolve 
under natural selection is not restricted to humans, of course. This 
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problem can be outlined like this: When ‘cooperation’ means that the 
cooperating individuals forgo achievable fitness benefits in order to reach 
a common goal, natural selection would be expected to favour mutants 
who do not cooperate and thereby reap those additional benefits. These 
uncooperative ‘defectors’ would then prosper and drive cooperators out of 
the population. At the core of a majority of game theoretical models used 
in the study of the evolution of cooperativeness stands the (N-person) 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (‘PD’; Rapoport and Chammah 1965; Axelrod and 
Hamilton 1981; Boyd 1988). In situations of genuine PD-type all 
participating parties do best by always defecting (i.e. ‘playing ALLD’). 
Their dominant strategies lead them directly into a Pareto-inefficient 
Nash-equilibrium (see Appendix 1 for a glossary of central game 
theoretical concepts used). Many evolutionary trajectories have been 
proposed along which humans might have come to evolve unique 
psychological and/or cultural capacities for overcoming the PD, but none 
of them has proven fully satisfying (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003; Boyd 
and Richerson 2006; Nowak 2012). In line with many other authors (e.g. 
Noë 1990; Dugatkin 1992; West et al. 2007a; Tomasello 2009; Tomasello 
et al. 2012), I would like to encourage a different way of looking at the 
problem. In the following I present yet another argument for thoroughly 
reconsidering the assumption that the social niche which human 
cooperativeness evolved in is best characterised solely by PD-type 
interactions. Moving away from exclusively PD-based models of the 
evolution of human cooperativeness allows for other socio-ecological 
scenarios to be considered, which can be argued to be at least as 
instructive as the common PD-scenarios and may have greater potential 
to result in satisfying explanations of why humans became such an 
outstandingly cooperative species. 
 
 
2. How cooperativeness can spread is well described, but how did it start?  
 
When interactions are modelled as one-shot PDs played by unrelated, 
randomly matched individuals, permanent defection prevails if no 
additional mechanisms (i.e. means for strategy selection or payoff 
modification), like e.g. punishment (e.g. Clutton-Brock and Parker 1995), 
or partner choice (e.g. Johnstone and Bshary 2008), or additional 
assumptions, e.g., about population structure (e.g. Ohtsuki et al. 2006), 
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asymmetries (e.g. Dawkins 2010) or interdependencies (e.g. Roberts 2004) 
between players are introduced. Various effective mechanisms and 
promotive scenarios have been studied in theory which allow for groups 
of more cooperative individuals to invade and stabilise or even grow to 
dominate in such environments (see e.g. Nowak 2012). A common feature 
of many of these theories, partly owing to the use of local ESS analysis as 
the only mathematical tool, is that they need to assume the existence of 
at least some individuals (‘founders’) equipped with more elaborate 
strategy selection mechanisms which interact frequently enough to reap 
the benefits of cooperation and thereby gain relative fitness advantages 
over defectors.  
But where do these founders of cooperation come from? Why did they 
evolve the more complicated and often slightly more vulnerable 
mechanisms they then apply in the otherwise defective environment? 
Now that we have gained a good overview of how cooperativeness can 
spread, this, I think, becomes the next challenging question.  
Where theoretical works using the PD-paradigm do discuss the origins 
of the more cooperative strategies they investigate, it is sometimes 
assumed that simple one-step mutations can lead to the appearance of a 
sufficiently large number of ‘hopeful monsters’ (Binmore 2006) to start 
the transformation process in a population. For a number of reasons it is 
doubtful that simple one-step mutations in a PD environment are always 
sufficient as explanations of the origins of cooperativeness (cf. e.g. André 
and Baumard 2011; Binmore 2006; Connor 1995; Dugatkin et al. 1992; 
Leimar and Hammerstein 2010; Skyrms 2004; Tomasello 2009; Tomasello 
et al. 2012). It is, of course, convenient to simply assume that cooperation 
evolved, or rather ‘emerged’, in (finite) human populations under weak 
selection (see, e.g., Nowak et al. 2004). In this view, the founders of 
cooperation did actually suffer relative fitness losses compared to 
defectors, but these were rather small; so small, that, eventually, 
cooperation as a strategy was not selected out and could―by 
chance―persist and escalate until it was frequent enough in the 
population to actually yield benefits to cooperative individuals. This 
explanation, however, has a ‘deus ex machina’ appeal. In the end, it still 
does not fully explain why some individuals started to cooperate. It just 
assumes that this happened somehow, presumably caused by random 
mutations, i.e., by mistake. But if this was so, why did that mistake 
happen rather frequently and across independent individuals? The 
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question thus remains: What caused the initial emergence of cooperative 
strategies in environments of PD-type? To answer it, some authors have 
proposed that the mechanisms that allow for cooperative solutions of PDs 
evolved for other problems and were applied to the PD only later 
(Binmore 2006; Tomasello 2009; Tomasello et al. 2012). After a brief 
review of the more general strengths and weaknesses of the PD-paradigm, 
I would like to try to make one more point in favour of this view.  
 
 
3. Why study Prisoner’s Dilemma models at all? 
 
A simple answer to this question would be that only in genuine PD-type 
situations a cooperation problem arises. Thus, ‘cooperation’ here would 
be defined as ‘playing C’ in a PD and could therefore only be studied in 
PD-type interactions. This conceptual rigorousness would exclude 
phenomena like giving and helping (Bshary and Bergmüller 2008) or 
mutually beneficial coordinated behaviour (Mesterton-Gibbons and 
Dugatkin 1997) from the study of the evolution of cooperativeness, 
which, many think, is too restrictive―mostly since including these 
phenomena has proven very fruitful (West et al. 2007b; Leimar and 
Hammerstein 2010). A second answer is that the PD poses the “most 
stringent” cooperative dilemma (Nowak 2012) and thus can be used for 
‘stress testing’ cooperation enabling mechanisms in theory, following the 
logic of ‘if cooperation can make it there, it can make it anywhere.’ I 
agree with this view―although, to my knowledge, the generalizability of 
results from PD models to other games has not been systematically 
investigated (Bshary and Bergmüller 2008; for advances in this direction 
see, e.g.: Dugatkin et al. 1992; Hauert et al. 2006; Kümmerli et al. 2007; 
Santos et al. 2011).  Acknowledging the attractiveness of the PD as a 
performance benchmark in theoretical studies, we then have to ask, why 
we do not find more congruence of the hypothesised mechanisms with 
real animal behaviour (Noë 1990; Clutton-Brock 2009). There are at least 
two ways of answering this (which are not completely independent from 
one another). 
First, one can review the, sometimes rather implicit, assumptions 
made by PD models about the situation in which the game actually is 
played and ask for each of these how realistic they are. They include: 
repeated or one-shot interaction, relatedness, population size and 
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structure, anonymity and capabilities of partner recognition, memory 
constraints, ‘trembling hands’, availability of punishments/rewards, 
matching rules/partner choice, synchronous decision making, forced play, 
availability of reputation information and its dynamics, symmetry, 
unavailability of third strategic options and more—see e.g. Raihani and 
Bshary (2011) and Nowak (2012) for discussions. The length of this listing 
already suggests that ‘the pure PD situation’ might be quite difficult to 
find in reality. Many, maybe too many, requirements have to be met by 
reality to match the theoretical models.  
Second, it might simply be that no real world interaction actually has 
PD-type payoffs. There are reasons to doubt that (Raihani and Bshary 
2011). Nevertheless, empirically it has turned out quite challenging to 
identify real world situations, for which the resulting ‘net payoff’ matrix 
of the game effectively played still has the features of a PD, when all 
relevant influences are taken into account. Thus, accepting that real 
social interaction situations exist which prima facie seem to possess PD-
type payoffs, one could still argue that this impression very frequently 
disappears when looking more closely at the situation the game is 
embedded in. If, for example, interdependence between the players is 
allowed, the payoff matrix eventually changes to take the form of a ‘Stag 
Hunt’ game (SH; Roberts 2004). Also, if the PD game is repeated with 
the same partner with a certain probability, the net payoffs can be 
argued to take the form of a SH under some conditions (Skyrms 2004). 
These examples show that the two ways of criticising the PD are not 
independent: changing assumptions about the situation in which the 
game is played, frequently, if not always, changes the effective net 
payoffs as well. 
Thus, this seems to be the heart of the debate about the use of PD 
models: Are there real situations in which the effective net payoffs 
actually form a PD? And if so: how frequent are they in nature, or, 
focussing on humans, how frequent and important were they in our 
ancestral past? I do not even want to start to try to answer this question 
empirically here. Instead, I would like to propose a new, admittedly 
rough, way of assessing the a priori relevance of PD-type games. 
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4. Can we assess the relevance of the Prisoner’s Dilemma a priori? 
 
For various reasons, including those just given, it is a very difficult task 
to determine the actual payoffs for the decision problems that ancestral 
populations (and species) were facing (see e.g. Alvard and Nolin 2002; 
Bird et al. 2012). If we knew these payoffs, speculation about the niche in 
which human cooperativeness evolved would be over. But since we do 
not, it might be worthwhile to try to simply examine all possible 
distributions of payoffs and see if that structure already suggests 
anything. Since most classical and a majority of recent theoretical works 
on the spread of cooperative traits do also do so, and for reasons of 
analytical feasibility, let us restrict a first analysis to interactions of two 
individuals facing binary decisions, i.e. classical 2x2 games. Subsequent 
analysis should of course also investigate games with more strategies (like 
e.g. Worden and Levin 2007) and/or more players (see e.g. Connor 2010).  
The infinite space of possible payoff matrices can be reduced to a 
manageable size by restricting analyses to non-strictly ordered preference 
distributions: i.e. each player can have up to four different preferences for 
interaction outcomes, indicated by 1 to 4, 4 being the most preferred 
outcome. The finite but still ample space of games spanned by all 
combinations of possible preference distributions can then again be 
reduced by eliminating strategically equivalent games. Two games are 
strategically equivalent if one can be obtained from the other by 
renaming players and/or their respective strategies. At the end of this 
computation 726 unique matrices remain which can be studied by 
exhaustion (see Appendix 1; Guyer and Hamburger 1968; Fraser and 
Kilgour 1986). Recently, a very elegant way of topologically arraying 
preference distributions has been put forward (Robinson and Goforth 
2005). That method focuses only on strictly ordered preferences and does 
not exclude strategically equivalent distributions. However, the following 
observations mutatis mutandis also hold for that subclass of 
distributions, of course. 
The crucial feature of PD-type situations is that both players have 
strictly dominant strategies which in combination lead to a Pareto-
inefficient outcome. Among the 726 possible games, there are 91 in which 
both players possess a strictly dominant strategy. But only two of these 
are PD-type (Table 1): the PD, of course, and an asymmetrical variant in 
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which one of the players cannot benefit from mutual cooperation while 
the other could. 
 
 
 
 C D 
C 3 : 3 1 : 4 
D 4 : 1 2 : 2 
 
 C D 
C 2 : 3 1 : 4 
D 3 : 1 2 : 2 
 
Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) 
Single inefficient Nash-equilibrium 
(D,D) 
Asymmetrical variant of PD  
Single inefficient Nash-equilibrium 
(D,D) 
 
Table 1: The two PD-type situations 
 
Thus, only 2 of 726 (=0.28%) preference distributions have the 
detrimental characteristics of a PD. In contrast to that, the combination 
of both players’ dominant strategies leads to an at least Pareto-efficient 
outcome in 89 of 726 cases (=12.26%). In 40 of these 89 (=5.5%) the 
outcome is optimal for one of the players. In 36 cases (=4.96%) it is even 
optimal for both. A subset of the remaining 635 (=87.47%) preference 
distributions are those 234 cases (=32.23%) in which one player has a 
strictly dominant strategy and the other has a best response to that 
strategy.  When the later chooses that best response, the resulting 
outcome is at least Pareto-efficient in 214 cases (=29.48%). It is optimal 
for one player in 108 cases (=14.88%) and optimal for both in 96 cases 
(=13.22%). However, the remaining 20 cases (=2.75%) in this subset 
have the character of a milder dilemma. In 8 of these cases (=1.10%) the 
Pareto-inefficient result is optimal for one player. Thus, Pareto-
inefficiency here implies that this player would have to be brought to 
switch strategies to allow for the improvement of the other player’s 
outcome while potentially risking her own optimal outcome. In the 
remaining 12 cases (=1.65%) the Pareto-inefficient outcome is optimal for 
none of the players. In 6 (=0.83%) of these cases, switching to an 
alternative strategy by one or both players could at best benefit one of 
them. In the remaining 6 cases both could benefit from switching 
strategies simultaneously. These six cases are the so called ‘Alibi games’ 
which are the closest ‘relatives’ of the PD (Robinson and Goforth 2005) in 
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the sense that they possess unique equilibria which are inefficient in such 
a way that leaving them could actually benefit both players. 
In the remaining 401 (=55.23%) conceivable games the concept of 
strictly dominant strategies cannot be applied. For that subset other 
means for strategy selection have to be investigated, e.g. risk-dominance 
analysis. When relaxing the requirement, e.g., that the inefficient Nash-
equilibrium needs to be the result of two strictly dominant strategies or 
one strictly dominant strategy and a best response to that strategy, we 
find a total 34 (=4.68%) games which have a unique inefficient Nash-
equilibrium. This set, e.g., represents a good candidate for a broader 
definition of cooperative dilemmas. Although a systematic analysis of the 
whole space of distributions promises further insights, it would, however, 
go beyond the scope of the argument here (Hauert et al. 2006).  
 
Strategic scenario 
Count 
(%) 
No strictly dominant strategies 
401 
(55.23) 
One strictly dominant strategy, Pareto-efficient outcome 
214 
(29.48) 
Two strictly dominant strategies, Pareto-efficient 
outcome 
89 
(12.26) 
Mild dilemmas: one strictly dominant strategy, Pareto-
inefficient outcome, optimal for one of the actors 
8 
(1.10) 
Mild dilemmas: one strictly dominant strategy, Pareto-
inefficient outcome, optimal for none of the actors, 
switching would only benefit one actor 
6 
(0.83) 
Alibi games: one strictly dominant strategy, Pareto-
inefficient outcome, optimal for none of the actors, 
switching could benefit both actors 
6 
(0.83) 
PD-type games: two strictly dominant strategies, 
Pareto-inefficient outcome 
2 
(0.28) 
 
Table 2: Summary of game counts for various strategic situations 
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Although the figures stated (summarised in Table 2) are derived from 
very basic combinatorial and game theoretical considerations, I believe 
they suffice to show that PD-type situations are outliers in a structural 
sense. In order to assess the ecological relevance of PD-type problems 
more thorough quantitative investigations of our most likely ancestral 
(social) ecology need to be made, of course (as do e.g. Hawkes 1993; Hill 
2002). What I have tried to show here is merely that from an a priori 
mathematical perspective, in almost all conceivable 2x2 social 
interactions no PD-type situation arises. 
At a closer look, this result has a trivial appeal. And indeed, instead of 
enumerating all 726 games and counting those which match the PD 
criterion, we can also take a shortcut. Using the standard notation for 
2x2 games (payoffs X  {T, R, P, S}) but allowing for asymmetry 
(payoffs Xi with i = 1,2 denoting the respective player) the PD definition 
demands that both players have a strictly dominant strategy, yielding 
(w.l.o.g.) Ti > Ri and Pi > Si, and that the combination of these strategies 
must be Pareto-inefficient, thus (i) Pi < Ri or (iia) P1 < R1 and P2 = R2 or 
(iib) P1 = R1 and P2 < R2. Conditions (iia) and (iib) are obtainable from 
one another by renaming players and thus yield only one strategically 
unique game which satisfies them. Translated into preferences this 
directly results in the two games given in Table 1. Thus, in the space of 
the 726 strategically unique 2x2 games in preferences PD-type 
interactions can be said to be rare by definition. 
The next step, and maybe the last one that can be taken a priori, is 
thus to move away from the 726 games set and try to estimate the 
frequency with which PD-type interactions occur when payoffs are 
randomly chosen. Since it is a combinatorially rather cumbersome 
enterprise to calculate the respective probabilities with which different 
classes of payoff matrices occur in such a process, I only present the 
results of a numerical simulation. Figure 1 shows the mean frequencies fn 
with which PD-type games arise from the following process: eight 
integers are drawn with replacement from a uniform distribution of the 
integers 1 through n. The integers are interpreted as a 2x2 game 
represented by the vector (T1, R1, P1, S1, T2, R2, P2, S2) and it is checked 
whether this game or one of its seven equivalent representations matches 
the PD definition as stated above. This is repeated 100.000 times for 
every n. Starting at f4  0.007 the observed mean PD frequencies 
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converge to a value f∞  0.034. Thus, interestingly, when randomly 
creating 2x2 games in the way described, the mean observed frequency of 
PD-type games is more than ten times higher than in the 726 games set 
but still quite small. (The difference in observed frequencies is 
presumably due to the fact that in the 726 games set many of the games 
created in the random process are counted only once because they are 
strategically equivalent. It is not obvious, and thus an interesting 
question for further research, however, how this deformation of 
probabilities works in detail.) 
 
Figure 1: Observed mean frequencies of PD-type games when randomly creating 
2x2 games with payoffs drawn with replacement from a uniform distribution of 
integers from 1 to n 
 
The interesting question for the current study is now: In what way—if 
at all—do these small a priori frequencies of PD-type games relate to real 
social interactions? It could well be that the costs and benefits of real 
interactions are somehow constrained in a way that makes PD-type 
payoff structures much more likely. A thorough investigation of this 
question seems overdue, but would encompass substantial empirical work 
and go beyond the scope of the reasoning presented here—for a related 
discussion see Raihani and Bshary (2011).  
To make this point most explicit: Both a priori considerations 
presented here, analytical and by simulation, do by no means show that 
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the PD is ecologically irrelevant; but even the space of 2x2 games, 
obviously, has a lot more to offer. This becomes relevant e.g. when we 
remember that small changes in the assumptions about the real situation 
which games are embedded in can change the effective net payoffs to 
form other games. The study of these other games, in my view, is a key to 
understanding where and why mechanisms for strategy choice evolved 
which also ‘do the trick’ in PDs. 
 
 
5. A cooptation hypothesis regarding cooperative behaviour 
 
Non-PD situations are not at all unproblematic, no doubt (Hauert et al. 
2006; Kümmerli et al. 2007). Many of them represent intricate decision 
problems, like the well-known ‘Stag Hunt’ (Skyrms 2004) or the ‘Hawk-
Dove’ game (Kümmerli et al. 2007; Smith and Price 1973). Nonetheless, 
in environments dominated by problems of non-PD-type it is possible to 
conceive of evolutionary trajectories toward ever greater cooperativeness 
without having to make use of ‘hopeful monsters’. Step-by-step natural 
selection can lead toward cooperation for mutual benefits in 
environments like these much easier (Binmore 2006; Leimar and 
Hammerstein 2010; Tomasello 2009; Tomasello et al. 2012). One scenario 
suggests itself quickly here: the transfer of behavioural mechanisms 
which are adaptive for interaction with kin to interactions with non-kin 
(see e.g. Axelrod and Hamilton 1981), an idea that has been called a ‘big 
mistake hypothesis’ (Boyd and Richerson 2006; Tomasello et al. 2012). 
Although I do think that this idea deserves more attention than Boyd 
and Richerson (2006) are willing to give to it, a recent empirical finding 
suggests that our ancestral social groups might have been composed of 
less kin than thought so far (Hill et al. 2011). This finding emphasises 
that we should also try to analyse ways by which cooperation among 
non-kin could have evolved from scratch. Prominent examples of 
cooperative bonds between unrelated individuals, which call for 
explanations that probably cannot be based on genetic relatedness at all, 
are interspecific mutualisms, like e.g. in certain plants and their fungal 
symbionts (e.g. Kiers et al. 2011) or in cleaner fish (Labroides dimidiatus; 
Bshary and Grutter 2003). But also cooperative behaviour in primates 
might frequently be better interpreted as solving coordination problems 
in non-PD-type situations than as solving Prisoner’s Dilemmas (Noë 
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1990). Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes; Bullinger et al. 2011), rhesus 
monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella; Brosnan 
et al. 2012) e.g. have been found to readily behave cooperatively in 
mutually beneficial Stag Hunt games. 
The cooptation hypothesis—see Buss et al. (1998) for a 
disambiguation of the term ‘cooptation’—now proposes that, once 
evolved, mechanisms for coordination on mutually beneficial outcomes in 
non-PD situations, like e.g. non-binding communication (Brosnan et al. 
2012; Koukoumelis et al. 2012; Noë 2006; Ostrom et al. 1992) or 
unilateral passive leadership (Bullinger et el. 2011), can also be 
successfully applied in PD-type situations. It would be worth 
investigating if this holds, e.g., for the basic partner control and partner 
choice mechanisms in repeated interaction. The well-known GRIM 
mechanism (‘completely stop cooperating once you have been defected 
against’), for example, does not only beat ALLD in iterated PDs under 
certain circumstances but can also lead to coordination on the payoff 
dominant equilibrium in iterated SHs (because GRIM actually makes 
every strategy combination that has a higher payoff than its achievable 
alternatives a Nash-equilibrium in games which are repeated sufficiently 
long enough, presumed that the other players are also playing GRIM; see 
Rubinstein 1979). The crucial point of the example is: if GRIM is thought 
of as a mechanism evolved for solving PDs, we would have to explain 
how a friendly strategy (GRIM cooperates until it is defected against) 
could have gained foothold in an otherwise defective population where it 
would have been exploited perpetually (i.e. in the ‘first round’ of every 
encounter). If we assume instead that GRIM evolved as a mechanism for 
stabilising mutually beneficial coordination in SH-like situations and was 
applied to severer dilemmas only later, then this explanatory problem 
simply disappears. 
Adding to this picture, it has been shown recently, to name a last 
example, that pre-play signalling, a mechanism which also readily 
evolves for coordination on mutually beneficial outcomes in Stag Hunt 
games, can destabilise the full defection equilibrium in PD games (Santos 
et al. 2011). 
I hope these first examples suffice to back up the idea that 
mechanisms allowing for cooperative solutions of PD-type situations 
might partly be cooptations of mechanisms which evolved for other, 
maybe more frequent, coordination problems. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
Social interactions of a kind in which it is not always the best option to 
defect, I think, form an indispensable bridge between kin selection driven 
evolution and the high levels of cooperativeness among unrelated 
strangers we observe in humans today. It is easier to understand why we 
seem to possess such distinctive inclinations to cooperate with 
conspecifics, when our ancestors thrived by successfully solving more and 
more coordination problems to mutual benefit, than when we conceive of 
them facing Prisoner’s Dilemmas every time they interacted (Tomasello 
et al. 2012). The contrast between the multitude of theoretical works on 
the evolution of cooperation using PD-type model situations and the 
sparseness of empirical evidence for the ecological validity of their 
findings in animals (Noë 2006; Clutton-Brock 2009) can be seen as a hint 
that some important link is missing here. In line with other authors, I 
would like to emphasise that we need to broaden the scope of search for 
mechanisms enabling cooperative behaviour also in humans. We should 
include mechanisms that offer solutions to milder coordination problems 
and investigate what happens when these are applied to problems of 
severer dilemma types.  
In short: From the structural perspective outlined here, it seems 
plausible that our evolutionary ancestors discovered more and more ways 
to reap mutual benefits and finally also applied the psychological and/or 
behavioural mechanisms they evolved for doing so to problems of PD-
type. Thus, the social niche (human) cooperativeness evolved in, I think, 
is best conceived of as a colourful mix of many coordination problems and 
only some severe dilemmas. 
 
 
Appendix 1: Glossary 
 
2x2-game  
An abstract representation of a decision situation involving two 
individuals (players) which have two options (strategies) to choose from. 
Here, games are represented as matrices with four panels (strategy 
combinations) which each indicate how strongly each of the two players 
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prefers the respective strategy combination. Players are named: R(ow) 
and C(olumn) and their strategies are U(p) and D(own) for R and L(eft) 
and R(ight) for C respectively. 
 
Best response 
A best response of, say, player R to a given strategy X of player C is the 
strategy R should choose in order to receive the highest payoff (to bring 
about R’s most preferred strategy combination) given that C actually 
plays X. No best response exists when R equally prefers both strategy 
combinations which could result from R’s decision. 
 
Dominant strategy 
A (strictly) dominant strategy is a strategy which is a best response to all 
strategies of the other player.  
 
ESS analysis 
A strategy s is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if it cannot be 
invaded by an initially rare mutant strategy m once s has reached a share 
of the population greater than some threshold. In ESS analysis it is 
sufficient, if such a threshold, e.g. 50%, exists. It leaves open the question 
of how s actually managed to reach that threshold. 
 
Nash-equilibrium 
A Nash-equilibrium is a strategy combination, say UL, which is a best 
response for both players. This means that none of the players has an 
incentive to unilaterally switch strategies, when assuming that the other 
player chooses U or L respectively. Combinations of dominant strategies 
always are Nash-equilibria. 
 
Pareto-efficiency 
A strategy combination is Pareto-efficient when every possible deviation 
from it would result in a less preferred outcome for one (or both) of the 
players. 
 
Preference distribution 
A preference distribution is a ranking of the four possible strategy 
combinations by one player (e.g. UL=1, DL=3, UR=2, DR=4). It does 
not have to be strictly ordered, meaning that two or more strategy 
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combinations can be equally preferred (e.g. UL=1, DL=1, UR=2, DR=2). 
Absolute payoffs (e.g. monetary units or fitness) can be converted into 
preferences simply by replacing a payoff with its respective rank in the 
set of payoffs of the player. 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
A Prisoner’s Dilemma is a game in which both players possess dominant 
strategies which in combination are Pareto-inefficient. 
 
 
Appendix 2: The 726 strategically unique 2x2 games in preference 
distributions 
 
A 2x2 game has two players (‘R(ow)’ and ‘C(olumn)’) who each have two 
strategies (‘U(p)’/’D(own)’ for R and ‘L(eft)’/’R(ight)’ for C). This yields 
four unique strategy combinations: UL, DL, UR, and DR. Each player 
can now assign up to four different preference values to these strategy 
combinations, whereby higher values indicate stronger preference. If, e.g., 
one player had no preferences at all, she would assign the value 1 to all 
four strategy combinations. If, e.g. R preferred UL and UR over DL and 
DR, but did not care whether L or R was played by C, she would assign 
two different preferences like this: UL~2, UR~2, DL~1, DR~1. (Thus, in 
this example, R does not have to take into account what C chooses, since 
C’s choice cannot change the outcome for R.) Every 2x2 game given in 
absolute payoffs can be mapped onto the respective game in preference 
distributions simply by replacing every payoff with its rank in the set of 
all four payoffs for that player: the payoff set (13, 29, 61, 19), e.g., would 
thus be transformed to the preference distribution (1, 3, 4, 2). Note that 
this mapping function is surjective but non-injective: one game in 
preference distributions corresponds to an (infinite) set of games in 
absolute payoffs. 
There are 726 strategically unique 2x2 games when the four possible 
strategy combinations are given as non-strictly ordered preference 
distributions for each of the two players. These 726 unique games can be 
obtained by simply enumerating all combinatorially possible games (= 48 
= 65 536 games) and including only those in the list of unique games, 
which are not strategically equivalent to a game which is already on the 
list. (A simple computer program for this purpose as well as the list of 
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unique games with their strategic properties is available from the author 
upon request; see the original papers by Guyer and Hamburger (1968) 
and Fraser and Kilgour (1986) for additional details.) 
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